The U.S. Supreme Court Decides Unanimously in Favor of Jones Act seaman
In a wonderful victory for Jones Act seaman and injured maritime workers generally, last year, the United States Supreme Court decide Stewart v. Dutra, a case involving whether an injured dredge worker was a Jones Act "seaman" and whether the dredge he was on was a "vessel" for Jones Act purposes.
The case is a must-read for all maritime attorneys and is recommended for Jones Act seaman and maritime workers generally.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided, essentially, that anything "practically capable" of moving across the water, whether it does so or not, is a "vessel" for Jones Act purposes.
You can find the case by clicking here.
I've also set forth some of the more important parts of the case below.
1. The Jones Act was enacted in 1920 to remove a bar to negligence suits by seaman. The Act itself does not define "seaman," but the general backdrop of maritime demonstrates that "seaman" was and is a term of art under general maritime law. Unlike sea-based workers, land-based workers injured offshore are covered by the Longhsore & Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (the "LWHCA"). The LWHCA excludes from coverage the "master or member of the crew of any vessel." The Jones Act and LWHCA work together--one provides coverage for "seaman," and the other for land-based worekrs.
2. The LHWCA did not define “vessel” when enacted, but §§1 and 3 of the Revised Statutes of 1873 specified that, in any Act passed after February 25, 1871, “ ‘vessel’ includes every description of water-craft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.” The LHWCA is such an Act. Section 3’s definition has remained virtually unchanged to the present and continues to supply the default definition of “vessel” throughout the U.S. Code. Section 3 merely codified the meaning “vessel” had acquired in general maritime law. In fact, prior to the passage of the Jones Act and the LHWCA, this Court and lower courts had treated dredges as vessels. By the time those Acts became law in the 1920’s, it was settled that §3 defined “vessel” for their purposes, and that a structure’s status as a vessel under §3 depended on whether the structure was an instrument of naval transportation. See Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 259. Then as now, dredges served a waterborne transportation function: In performing their work they carried machinery, equipment, and a crew over water. This Court has continued to treat §3 as defining “vessel” in the LHWCA and to construe §3 consistently with general maritime law. Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565. Pp. 6—10.
3. Previous cases made a sensible distinction between watercraft temporarily stationed in a particular location and those permanently anchored to shore or the ocean floor. A watercraft is not capable of being used for maritime transport in any meaningful sense if it has been permanently moored or otherwise rendered practically incapable of transportation or movement. By including special-purpose vessels like dredges, the act is broad, but other prerequisites to qualifying for seaman status under the Jones Act provide some limits. For example, a worker seeking such status must prove that his duties contributed to the vessel’s function or mission and that his connection to the vessel was substantial in nature and duration.
4. The First Circuit held that the Super Scoop is not a “vessel” because its primary purpose is not navigation or commerce and because it was not in actual transit at the time of Stewart’s injury. Neither prong of that test is consistent with §3’s text or general maritime law’s established meaning of “vessel.” Section 3 requires only that a watercraft be “used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water,” not that it be used primarily for that purpose. The Super Scoop was not only “capable of being used” to transport equipment and passengers over water–it was so used. Similarly, requiring a watercraft to be in motion to qualify as a vessel under §3 is the sort of “snapshot” test rejected in Chandris. That a vessel must be “in navigation,” means not that a structure’s locomotion at any given moment matters, but that structures may lose their character as vessels if withdrawn from the water for an extended period. The “in navigation” requirement is thus relevant to whether a craft is “used, or capable of being used,” for naval transportation. The inquiry whether a craft is “used, or capable of being used,” for maritime transportation may involve factual issues for a jury, but here no relevant facts were in dispute. Dutra conceded that the Super Scoop was only temporarily stationary while the scow was being repaired; it had not been taken out of service, permanently anchored, or otherwise rendered practically incapable of maritime transport. Finally, Dutra conceded that the Super Scoop is a “vessel” under §905(b), which imposes LHWCA liability on vessel owners for negligence to longshoremen.
