Why is the Jones Act important for injured offshore workers?

Posted on February 15, 2007 by BB

The Jones Act was enacted in 1920.  The purpose of the Jones Act was to encourage U.S. maritime commerce, by, among other things, offering appropriate legal protections to injured seamen. 

Seamen are exposed every day to unique dangers and perils.  They must brave the open seas, work on dangerous offshore oil rigs, perform hard dredge work, master complicated maritime procedures and policies, watch out for their fellow workers, dive to great depths off of boats, ships, and rigs, work long hours, work in extreme weather conditions, and be away from their families for long periods of time.

All too often, the wages are not commensurate with the risks.  The sacrifices our maritime workers make every day to ensure that maritime commerce flows smoothly, that oil production in the Gulf of Mexico and elsewhere takes place, that ships and other vessels can make port, absolutely requires that the law recognize and protect them appropriately.

To take just one example:  When Hurricanes Katrina and Rita ravaged Gulf Coast oil production, and destroyed and disrupted the oil supply, our seamen and offshore workers came to the rescue, turning out in record numbers to get oil production back on line. 

It's not the executives in the fancy suits making millions of dollars a year who deserve our congratulations--although they often take all the credit.  The executives in the tall buildings didn't get the rigs repaired, the derricks fixed, the oil flowing.  No, it was the men and women of the offshore industry, the captains, pilots, roughnecks, deckhands, drillers, divers, toolpushers, ordinary and able bodied seamen, and other offshore laborers who braved the harsh conditions, spent time away from their families, and risked their health and safety to get oil production back on line in record time.  They didn't make millions of dollars a year to do the work--all too often, they were paid inadequately for the risks they took.   And they got no credit for what they did.  But they deserve the credit--their labor got oil production flowing.

Even in this age of so-called tort reform, where insurance companies and multi-billion dollar multi-national companies do everything they can to avoid responsibility to injured workers and their familes, most reasonable and fair-minded lawmakers recognize the amazing contributions made every day by offshore workers, Jones Act seamen, divers, dredge workers, captains, relief captains, tankermen, cooks, pilots, roustabouts, roughnecks, drillers, barge workers, and other offshore workers.

That's why the Jones Act is so important.  It is a formal and legal recognition of the contributions of offshore workers.  It shows that we appreciate their sacrifices, the risks they take every day, and what they contribute to our country's economic security.  It shows that the United States values the workers who make the money just as highly as we value the executives who hire and fire the workers and who never risk their health or safety on an offshore rig, boat, dredge barge, or other offshore vessel.

This entry, while not discussing any breaking legal news or cases, is made in an effort to congratulate the men and women who make the maritime industry work and to encourage all reasonable and fair-minded people, whether involved in the offshore industry or not, to congratulate the men and women who risk their lives to work offshore.

Everyone who has ever gone to sea to work offshore should be congratulated for what you do.   My firm is proud to stand by you in your moment of need, to represent you when necessary, and to call so many of you clients--and friends.

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The U.S. Supreme Court Decides Unanimously in Favor of Jones Act seaman

Posted on January 31, 2007 by BB

In a wonderful victory for Jones Act seaman and injured maritime workers generally, last year, the United States Supreme Court decide Stewart v. Dutra, a case involving whether an injured dredge worker was a Jones Act "seaman" and whether the dredge he was on was a "vessel" for Jones Act purposes.

The case is a must-read for all maritime attorneys and is recommended for Jones Act seaman and maritime workers generally.

The U.S. Supreme Court decided, essentially, that anything "practically capable" of moving across the water, whether it does so or not, is a "vessel" for Jones Act purposes.

You can find the case by clicking here.

I've also set forth some of the more important parts of the case below.


1.  The Jones Act was enacted in 1920 to remove a bar to negligence suits by seaman.  The Act itself does not define "seaman," but the general backdrop of maritime demonstrates that "seaman" was and is a term of art under general maritime law.  Unlike sea-based workers, land-based workers injured offshore are covered by the Longhsore & Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (the "LWHCA").  The LWHCA excludes from coverage the "master or member of the crew of any vessel."  The Jones Act and LWHCA work together--one provides coverage for "seaman," and the other for land-based worekrs.

2.  The LHWCA did not define “vessel” when enacted, but §§1 and 3 of the Revised Statutes of 1873 specified that, in any Act passed after February 25, 1871, “ ‘vessel’ includes every description of water-craft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.” The LHWCA is such an Act. Section 3’s definition has remained virtually unchanged to the present and continues to supply the default definition of “vessel” throughout the U.S. Code. Section 3 merely codified the meaning “vessel” had acquired in general maritime law. In fact, prior to the passage of the Jones Act and the LHWCA, this Court and lower courts had treated dredges as vessels. By the time those Acts became law in the 1920’s, it was settled that §3 defined “vessel” for their purposes, and that a structure’s status as a vessel under §3 depended on whether the structure was an instrument of naval transportation. See Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 259. Then as now, dredges served a waterborne transportation function: In performing their work they carried machinery, equipment, and a crew over water. This Court has continued to treat §3 as defining “vessel” in the LHWCA and to construe §3 consistently with general maritime law. Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565. Pp. 6—10.

3. Previous cases made a sensible distinction between watercraft temporarily stationed in a particular location and those permanently anchored to shore or the ocean floor. A watercraft is not capable of being used for maritime transport in any meaningful sense if it has been permanently moored or otherwise rendered practically incapable of transportation or movement. By including special-purpose vessels like dredges, the act is broad, but other prerequisites to qualifying for seaman status under the Jones Act provide some limits.   For example, a worker seeking such status must prove that his duties contributed to the vessel’s function or mission and that his connection to the vessel was substantial in nature and duration.

4.  The First Circuit held that the Super Scoop is not a “vessel” because its primary purpose is not navigation or commerce and because it was not in actual transit at the time of Stewart’s injury. Neither prong of that test is consistent with §3’s text or general maritime law’s established meaning of “vessel.” Section 3 requires only that a watercraft be “used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water,” not that it be used primarily for that purpose. The Super Scoop was not only “capable of being used” to transport equipment and passengers over water–it was so used. Similarly, requiring a watercraft to be in motion to qualify as a vessel under §3 is the sort of “snapshot” test rejected in Chandris.    That a vessel must be “in navigation,” means not that a structure’s locomotion at any given moment matters, but that structures may lose their character as vessels if withdrawn from the water for an extended period. The “in navigation” requirement is thus relevant to whether a craft is “used, or capable of being used,” for naval transportation.    The inquiry whether a craft is “used, or capable of being used,” for maritime transportation may involve factual issues for a jury, but here no relevant facts were in dispute. Dutra conceded that the Super Scoop was only temporarily stationary while the scow was being repaired; it had not been taken out of service, permanently anchored, or otherwise rendered practically incapable of maritime transport. Finally, Dutra conceded that the Super Scoop is a “vessel” under §905(b), which imposes LHWCA liability on vessel owners for negligence to longshoremen.
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