Maritime Injury Lawyer & Attorney : Vujasinovic & Beckcom : Jones Act : Serving Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi

Last week, a Houston Federal District Court jury returned a 1.2 million dollar verdict against New York based Penn Maritime in a Jones Act injury case.

The Jones Act seaman was injured while working on a Penn Maritime barge.  While cleaning the bulkhead, he slipped on a defective stool and injured his back and neck.  He brought claims for maintenance and cure, negligence, and unseaworthiness against Penn Maritime.

Penn Maritime denied all the allegations, refused to pay maintenance and cure, and claimed that the injured Jones Act seaman essentially made up the incident, even though he reported it immediately in accordance with all company policies and procedures.

Penn  Maritime did not offer a reasonable settlement, so the injured Jones Act seaman was forced to trial.

After a five day trial, the jury rejected Penn Martime's defenses and issued a 1.2 million dollar verdict, finding Penn Maritime 50% responsible for the incident.  The jury awarded full maintenance and cure as well as significant pain and suffering and economic damages.

The case was handled by Kurt Arnold, Jason Itkin, and Brian Beckcom.  To learn more about this case, please contact Kurt Arnold or Jason Itkin at Arnold & Itkin or Brian Beckcom at Vujasinovic & Beckcom, toll free 877.724.7800.

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has upheld a $19,000,000 verdict in a maritime injury case.

The case, styled In re Superior Construction Co., Inc. v. Charles Brock et al, involved injuries to recreational boaters.

Superior Construction Company was the general contractor for the Florida Department of Transportation’s work expanding the Blanding Boulevard Bridge over the Cedar River in Jacksonville, Florida.  The company frequently stationed the barge and the tug so that recreational boaters could  pass under the bridge.  On December 29, 2001, the company tied the barge and the tug so that they blocked a large portion of the waterway commonly used by recreational boaters to pass under the bridge. In addition, employees positioned the tug perpendicular to the barge, further hindering passage.

The barge was painted black which made it difficult to see at night.  The barge and tug had a total of twelve lights and on the night of the collision only three of ten lights on the barge, and only one of two lights on the tug, were operating.

Charles Brock was driving a recreational boat and approached the bridge at night.  Brock slowed the boat and turned to pass through one of the three spans used by recreational boaters. Neither he nor anyone on his boat saw barge until it was too late to avoid a crash.  As a result of the allision, he and his passengers suffered extensive injuries.

Superior brought an admiralty action in federal district court seeking to limit its liability for the allision under the Limitation of Liability Act.2 Brock and his passengers counterclaimed. The district court found that Superior was not entitled to limit its liability and that Superior was responsible for the injuries. Superior appealed.  On appeal, Superior claimed that the barge had not obstructed traffic and that the company had overcome the presumption that they were at fault.   Superior also claimed that the court should have assigned a percentage of fault to Brock, since his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit under federal and state law.

The appellate court reviewed the district court’s application of two rules that apply when a moving vessel allides with a stationary vessel. The first rule, called the Oregon Rule, says that the burden of proof is initially on the moving vessel to prove that the allision was the stationary vessel’s fault and that the moving vessel acted with reasonable care or that the accident was unavoidable.  The Pennsylvania Rule, by contrast, shifts the burden to the stationary vessel if it violates a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions.  The stationary vessel must then prove that its statutory violation could not have been a cause of the accident.   In cases where both vessels involved in the allision are operating in violation of statutes designed to prevent accidents, the Pennsylvania Rule requires the court to find that both parties contributed to the accident, unless it finds that either party could not have been at fault.

The court found that Superior had violated a federal statute stating that it is unlawful to tie up or anchor vessels in a way that would obstruct other vessels from passing through a channel. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s opinion that the only cause of the accident could have been Superior’s actions in placing and lighting the barge.  The Court also explained that the company failued to warn the Coast Guard or recreational boaters.

Superior appealed the amount of damages awarded to two of the passengers, claiming they were too high.  The Court disagreed.

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The San Antonio Court of Appeals recently issued a unanimous opinion affirming a $1,585,000.00 jury verdict in a Jones Act case.  The opinion is styled Weeks Marine, Inc. v. Salinas.

Salinas worked for Weeks Marine, a dredging company, as a mate.  He worked on the M/V BTD II, a dredge boat.  While the dredge was in a repair facility in Houma, Louisiana, Salinas injured his back.  He was hurt while lifting two 45 pound batteries.  He was required to carry these batteries from the yard across two gangways.   He was hurt as he stepped from one of the gangways.

The jury found that Salinas was a Jones Act seaman, that Weeks Marine was negligent, that the M/V BTD II was unseaworthy, and issued a verdict of $1,585,000.00, which the trial court reduced to $1,109,500.00.

Weeks Marine appealed.  It claimed that Salinas was not a Jones Act seaman, that the vessel wasn't unseaworthy, and that the evidence of future economic loss was insufficient to support the jury's findings. 

The Court rejected all of Weeks' appellate points, and rightfully so.  Perhaps more importantly, the Court of Appeals also reinstated part of the jury's verdict that the trial court had reduced based on Salinas' contributory negligence.  The Court reasoned that Weeks Marine never requested an additional instruction "inquiring about whether despite the unseaworthy condition, Salinas was contributorily negligence with regard to the injuries he suffered as a result of the unseaworthy condition."  In other words, Weeks Marine waived its contributory negligence defense.

This opinion is a straightforward discussion of seaman status, Jones Act negligence, and unseaworthiness, and re-affirms the legal standards in Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims, as well as the evidence sufficient to support such findings.

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